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Non-technical summary
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that
use the same and/or compatible products (e.g. software, operating systems, telecommu-
nications, consumer electronics, etc.). These industries exhibit two main characteristics
that distinguish them from more conventional markets. First, they exhibit rapid techno-
logical progress and competition is focused on investments in R&D in order to develop
innovations that will provide market leadership (e.g interactive TV, video formats, digi-
tal imaging, etc.). Second, although new firms enter the market, they are characterized
by highly concentrated market structures (e.g. operating systems, audio formats, video
games, etc.).
This paper develops a fully dynamic duopoly model of quality competition in the
presence of network externalities and endogenous and uncertain R&D investments. It
numerically investigates the effect of network externalities on the incentives to invest in
R&D, the efficiency of those investments in comparison with the social optimum and the
potential role of competition policy. Moreover, given that industry evolution is driven by
innovations that are dynamic in nature, we analyze the impact of network externalities
on the short and long-run evolution of the industry. Finally, and due to the considerable
short-run market power that these industries tend to exhibit, the impact of competition
policy on the dynamic evolution of the industry is analyzed and some policy prescriptions
that can increase consumers’ welfare are proposed.
The paper shows three main results. First, network externalities positively affect the
incentives to invest in R&D. In the model, competition resembles a preemption race (i.e.
winner-takes-all) and installed bases (i.e. network sizes) increase the prize that can be won
by a successful innovator. As a consequence, market performance tends to over-invest in
R&D in comparison with the socially optimal amount. Second, network externalities have
an important impact in the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although in the long-run a
single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race), in the short-run competition is fierce
and it is concentrated on firms with similar technologies. And third, policy measures that
increase the level of competition (e.g. mandatory licensing) and prolong the fierce short-
run competition in the industry may have an important positive impact on consumers’
welfare and on firms’ R&D incentives.
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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives to undertake uncertain R&D initiatives in a
dynamic duopoly network industry. It is shown that network externalities posi-
tively affect the incentives to invest in R&D. In the model, competition resembles a
preemption race and, therefore, market performance implies an over-investment in
R&D in comparison with the social optimum. Moreover, network externalities have
an important impact in the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although in the
long-run a single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race), short-run competi-
tion is very fierce and concentrated on neck-and-neck technological configurations.
This short-run competition is fiercer and longer, the higher the level of network
externalities. Policy measures that increase technological diffusion (i.e. mandatory
licensing), increase the level of competition and/or prolong the short-run compe-
tition have an important positive impact on consumer welfare and on firms’ R&D
incentives.
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1 Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that
use the same and/or compatible products. For the firms in those sectors (e.g. software,
operating systems, telecommunications, consumer electronics, etc.), the presence of net-
work externalities implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function of their
quality-adjusted prices and the potential benefits attached to their expected network sizes
(i.e. installed bases).1
Network industries exhibit several properties that do not only distinguish them from
more conventional markets, but that decisively affect firms’ strategies.2 On the one hand,
rapid technological progress is a common observation in many industries with network
externalities.3 In fact, competition in network industries centers around investments in
intellectual property (i.e. R&D) in order to develop and introduce drastic innovations
that will confer market leadership.4 On the other hand, and partially as a consequence
of the strong technological competition, industries that exhibit network externalities tend
to be characterized by a highly concentrated market structure (i.e. operating systems,
audio formats, video games, etc.). This situation is reinforced by the role of consumers’
expectations.5
As a result of these two characteristics of network industries (i.e. rapid technological
progress and market concentration), formal analyses on the evolution of these industries
are particularly relevant for policy considerations. For instance, competition policy plays
a key role as a mean to monitor such unavoidable market dominance (i.e. to limit unde-
sirable market power) without hindering innovation incentives (i.e. to protect the benefits
and rights of successful innovators).
1See Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrel and Saloner (1985, 1986) for seminal treatments, and
Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) for surveys on network markets.
2See, for example, Gabel (1991), Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Grindley (1995)
and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for general analyses of the impact of network externalities on firms’
strategies.
3Technological innovations allow rivalling firms to introduce new products like interactive TV, Digital
Versatile Disk (DVD), and digital imaging. In nascent industries, extensive investments in R&D are
usually required to introduce new standards or dominant designs.
4Evans and Schmalensee (2001) argue that firms in network industries engage in competition ”for the
market”, as opposed to static price/output competition ”in the market”.
5Due to the presence of network externalities, a network technology may dominate a market only
because it is expected to do so. The initial success of the MS-DOS operating system is attributed not to
any technical superiority, but to the fact that it was supported by IBM.
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This paper develops a fully dynamic duopoly model of quality competition in the
presence of network externalities and endogenous and uncertain R&D investments. We
investigate the effect of network externalities on the incentives to invest in R&D, the
efficiency of those investments in comparison with the social optimum and the potential
role of competition policy. Moreover, given that industry evolution is driven by inno-
vations that are dynamic in nature, we analyze the impact of network externalities on
the short and long-run evolution of the industry. Finally, and due to the considerable
short-run market power that these industries tend to exhibit, we also analyze the impact
of competition policy on the dynamic evolution of the industry and propose some policy
prescriptions that can increase consumers’ welfare.
In spite of its relevance, the literature on investment processes, R&D efforts and
innovation initiatives in industries that exhibit network externalities is still in its early
stage of development. The existing literature, in its great majority, takes the processes
of R&D as exogenously given and analyzes the conditions under which an innovation is
adopted. Moreover, most of the work devoted to the analysis of investment decisions with
network externalities considers situations where the entrant arrives with a (exogenously
given) new technology, without considering a strategic response by the incumbent to the
threat of entry.6
Some of the main results of this literature are: i) new technologies tend to be adopted
too early and the successful entrant becomes an incumbent forever; ii) the structure of
property rights (i.e. sponsorship) over a new technology affect decisively its potential for
adoption; and iii) R&D incentives play no major role in affecting consumers’ expectations,
and hence, consumers’ choice. Kristiansen (1996) and Choi (1994) consider the case of
endogenous investment in network industries using two-period models and analyze the
riskiness associated to the R&D projects. Their results are focused on the divergence
between private and social incentives to invest and show the role of network externalities
in this divergence.
In this paper, our dynamic model of quality competition with network externalities
adapts the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework presented in Ericson and Pakes (1995).
We depart from the current literature on network industries by focusing our analysis on
four main areas. First, we consider endogenous and uncertain R&D efforts taking into
6See Farrell and Saloner (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Katz and Shapiro
(1992), De Bijil and Goyal (1995), Shy (1996), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), among others.
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account the way consumers form expectations. This allows us to analyze the incentives
to innovate as a result of strategic interaction inside the industry, to explore the impact
of network externalities on industry evolution and to compare our results with novel
advances in the literature on innovation-led growth. Second, we embed our analysis in a
fully dynamic framework. This implies that our results are independent of initial and/or
end conditions, permitting us to determine the equilibrium market structure endogenously
and to follow the industry through different time horizons. Third, we consider explicitly
the impact on the short and long-run social efficiency of the R&D incentives that drives
the evolution of the network industry and the role of competition policy in this evolution.
And fourth, we provide an assessment of the question whether competition policy should
be cautious in dynamically competing industries, as has been suggested by some observers.
More specifically, we consider two firms, an established firm and a challenger, that
compete each period with two incompatible technologies over an infinite horizon. To
capture the role of the installed base, we assume overlapping generations of homogeneous
consumers that live for two periods and make purchases (inelastically) only once when
they arrive to the market. Thus, in each period the population consists of a ”young” and
an ”old” generation of consumers.
The established firm in period t is the firm that won competition in period t − 1
(”young” consumers bought from it) and exhibits an installed base in period t (”old”
consumers cannot make another purchase). In addition, both firms offer a technology,
whose quality can be improved through endogenous and uncertain R&D efforts. At each
t, a firm invests in order to develop, with positive probability, an improvement of its
quality for period t+ 1. For simplicity, we assume that R&D outcome is either a success
or a failure and, if it is successful, it increments the value of the quality by a fixed amount.
Moreover, our flexible specification allows us to analyze the impact of the level of com-
petition on industry performance. In our framework, the role of competition is captured
by the (exogenous) probability that in a given period the relative quality of a network
good is reduced. This situation can be interpreted as the role played by independent
research facilities, universities, intellectual property law, etc. Therefore, our model cap-
tures the idea of quality competition in a market facing competitive pressure from within
and outside the industry. Given that competition takes place each period depending on
the level of quality of the good produced by the two firms, which in turn depends on
the stochastic R&D processes, the drivers of industry evolution are the investment incen-
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tives of the competing firms. This setup allows us to compare our results with important
existing work on the interplay between R&D, innovation and the level of competition.
The model is solved in two steps. In the first step, the product market competition
observed in each period is determined considering the expectation formation process. For
any given quality state (i.e. quality levels of the two firms), the equilibrium prices and
per-period profits are computed, allowing us to see the impact of network externalities
on consumers’ behavior. In the second step, given the outcome of the product market
competition, the fully dynamic investment decision problem is stated and solved numeri-
cally using the methodology developed by Pakes and McGuire (1994). Equilibrium occurs
when the two firms’ expectations about their competitors strategies are consistent with
their actual behavior.
We show three main results. First, network externalities affect positively the incentives
to invest in R&D. In our model, competition resembles a preemption race and installed
bases increase the prize that can be won by a successful competitor. As a consequence, it
is not surprising that market performance tends to over-invest in R&D. Second, network
externalities have an important impact in the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although
in the long-run a single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race) and this outcome is
socially optimal, in the short-run competition is stronger and it is concentrated on neck-
and-neck technological industry configurations. And third, policy measures that increase
the level of competition and prolong the fierce short-run competition in the industry may
have an important impact on consumers’ welfare and on firms’ R&D incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
presents the analysis of its equilibrium and the main results. Finally, section 4 concludes
and discusses some areas of further research.
2 The Model
We present a model of duopoly competition in a market that exhibits network externali-
ties. Time evolves discretely over an infinite horizon in order to avoid end effects. Both
firms produce with identical marginal costs but potentially different qualities. Consumers
are assumed to be homogeneous in an overlapping generations structure.
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2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process
There are two firms in the industry producing network goods. Let f ∈ F = {0, 1}
denote the identity of the firms, where 0 represents a firm that lacks an installed base
and 1 represents the firm with an installed base.7 It is assumed that goods produced
by different firms are mutually incompatible. That is, the size of the network associated
with a given firm is equal to the number of users of the good produced by that firm. For
simplicity it is assumed that marginal and fixed costs of production are equal to zero.8
At any period t, each firm exhibits a given quality embedded in the network good it
produces. This quality level is indexed by i and is independent of the network benefits
that the good may provide. In order to simplify exposition, it is assumed that this level
of quality is relative to an outside technology.9 This assumption serves two purposes.
First, it allows us to focus on a smaller set of possible qualities (i.e. relative qualities),
and second, it provides an upper limit to the per-period profits of the firms. This latter
condition is required for the existence of the equilibrium. For simplicity, it is further
assumed that the outside technology does not provide any network benefit.
In our duopoly setup, we denote the competitor of firm f and its quality level by f−
and j, respectively. Therefore, a firm in the industry can be fully describe by its state
(i, j, f).10 We consider i, j ∈ Q, where Q is the quality space and f ∈ F . We analyze the
case of Q = {1, 2, ...,M}. That is, there are M possible (relative) quality levels that can
be exhibited by a firm.11
Qualities evolve stochastically over time. This evolution depends on the firm’s own
costly R&D efforts and on the developments of the outside technology and/or competitive
environment. Specifically, firm f ’s own technology is improved with a probability that
depends positively on its investments. Let xf denote the investment level on R&D of firm
f . We take the probability that firm f improves its relative quality to be
xf
1+xf
. At the
7As will be explained below, the assumption of homogeneous consumers imply that in each period
only one firm captures the entire market. This fact means that at the beginning of each period, one firm
(f = 1) exhibit an installed base (i.e. captured the market the previous period), while the other firm has
no such base (f = 0).
8A linear demand specification guarantees that this assumption is without loss of generality.
9The outside technology can be thought as a technology that is publicly available to firm f and
is produced in, for example, universities or research facilities. Formally, if the actual quality state of
the technology produced by firm f is i∗ and the outside technology available to this firm is iout, then
i = i∗ − iout.
10Note that (i, j, f) actually describes the state of the industry because for every (i, j, f) there is a
corresponding (j, i, f−). This formulation will allow us to focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
11Note that the actual quality, the numerical value, is not defined yet.
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same time, δ denotes the probability that in each period the relative quality of firm f is
reduced. In our specification, the parameter δ can be interpreted as a measure of the level
of competition faced by the industry. For instance, a higher value of δ could be associated
with a more innovative independent research facilities or a higher degree of technology
(knowledge) diffusion. Throughout the paper we identify this parameter with the level of
competition.12
In the model, we assumed that relative qualities can only be improved (or reduced)
one step each period. Hence, if p(i′|i, xf ) denotes the probability that firm f will have
quality i′ in t+ 1 given that it has quality i and invests xf in t, we have,
p(i′|i, xf ) =

xf
1+xf
if i′ = i+ 1
1
1+xf
if i′ = i
if i = 1,
p(i′|i, xf ) =

(1−δ)xf
1+xf
if i′ = i+ 1
1−δ+δxf
1+xf
if i′ = i
δ
1+xf
if i′ = i− 1
if i = 2, ...,M − 1, and
p(i′|i, xf ) =

1−δ+xf
1+xf
if i′ = i
δ
1+xf
if i′ = i− 1
if i = M . As can be seen, this formulation implies that a given level of quality evolves
only one step within the state space (up, down or same position) from period to period.
We now explain the details of the demand side.
2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process
At any period t, there are two overlapping generations of consumers that live for two
periods. Each period a mass of 1 ”young” consumers arrives into the market and join a
mass of 1 ”old” consumers, so the total population in each period is constant and equal
12Note that there are alternative interpretations for this parameter (e.g. quality depreciation). Below
we present some conditions that support the interpretation we employ (i.e. level of competition).
8
to 2. Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous with an inelastic demand for a single
unit of the network goods offered by the firms. Upon arrival consumers observe the state
of the industry (i.e. they observe (i, j, f) and the corresponding (j, i, f−)), investments,
prices and, then, purchases take place. This process is explained below.
It is important to note that the assumption of homogeneous consumers imply that in
each period only one firm captures the new generation of ”young” consumers. Moreover,
once a firm captures the market, it will exhibit an installed base in the next period because
”old” consumers are locked-in. Therefore, at the beginning of each period there is one
firm with an installed base (i.e. f = 1) and one firm without it (i.e f = 0).
Note that consumers buy a durable network good only once, which amounts to say that
they exhibit prohibitively high switching cost, and therefore, they will be locked-in in the
second period of their lives with the network good that they bought in their first period.
In addition, note that before purchase takes place, consumers observe the investments
undertaken by the competing firms, and thus, the strategic role of the investment decision
is two-fold: i) to affect future quality; and ii) to influence directly consumers’ expectations
about the future installed base.
Importantly, in the presence of network externalities, a consumer decision depends
on how other consumers are deciding. Therefore, consumers must form expectations
about other consumers’ behavior. In our setup, this expectation formation process has
two dimensions. First, consumers arriving in the market in period t must also care
about how the other consumers also arriving in t decide (i.e. my utility is higher, the
more consumers in my own generation choose a compatible good). Second, given that
consumers are locked-in when they are ”old”, consumers arriving in period t must care
about the choice made by the new generation of ”young” consumers arriving in t + 1
(i.e. my utility is higher, the more next generation consumers choose a compatible good).
Moreover, consumers arriving in t care about the choice of consumers arriving in t + 1,
which in turn care about the choice of consumers in t+ 2, and so on.
Therefore, in order to calculate demand, the process under which consumers form
expectations must be determined in a way that is consistent with a dynamic equilib-
rium. We propose the following two-step expectation formation process. In the first step,
concerning the behavior among individuals of the same generation, we assume that the
consumers behave as ”optimal coordinators”. That is, consumers decide assuming that all
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their contemporaries are able to identify and coordinate on the Pareto-optimal choice.13
In the second step, concerning the expectations on the behavior of future consumers,
we assume that if in a given period the two competing goods exhibit the same quality,
the good provided by the firm with an installed base is preferred. In the case of quality
differences, the good with the higher quality is going to be favored. We assume that
consumers in t follow this rule and expect future consumers to follow it. As will be shown
below, this rule is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
Now that the demand and supply side have been explained, and before we state
formally the product market competition, as well as the firms’ dynamic problem, we
present the time structure. Specifically, at each period t events develop as follows,
• (Relative) quality values are realized
• Firms invest to improve quality
• Prices are determined
• Consumers arrive and observe the current quality state, investments and prices
• Purchases take place
2.3 Product Market Competition
In each period, a firm finds itself in state (i, j, f), where i is the (relative to an outside
good) quality state of the good it produces, j is the quality state of the competing firm,
and f is the identity of the firm according to the installed base.14 As we explained before,
consumers are homogeneous implying that only one firm captures the the entire market
each period. We assume that firms are engaged in price (Bertrand) competition in the
product market. Therefore, given our expectation formation process assumptions, we
calculate the maximum utility that a consumer may enjoy from each of the two network
goods, compare them and derive the corresponding equilibrium demands and prices.
Specifically, the benefit enjoyed by a generation of consumers arriving in the market
in a given period and buying from the firm with the installed base (f = 1) is given by,
13See Katz and Shapiro (1986), and Farrell and Katz (2005).
14Again, note that a state (i, j, f) implies that the competitor is in state (j, i, f−).
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u1i = ai + 2ω + β
[
(1− δ)ai + δai−1
+ ω(1 + 1 · p(i′ > j′|i, j) + 1 · p(i′ = j′|i, j))
]
.
(1)
In this expression, the first two terms represent the utility enjoyed by the consumer
in his first period when he is ”young”. In particular, ai represents the actual value of
the quality level (given state i) and 2ω represents the network benefits. Recall that the
quality values are relative to an outside option from competition outside the industry.
Moreover, equation (1) implicitly says that the outside option is not a network good from
a consumer’s perspective.15
Note that the expression presented in equation (1) is the utility derived from the
consumption of the good provided by the firm with an installed base. Therefore, in this
case the entire population would be consuming the good from firm f = 1 and the network
benefits is two times the valuation ω of those network benefits (i.e. 2ω).
The third term corresponds to the utility derived in the second period when the
consumer is ”old”, where β is the discount factor. Given that the consumer is locked-in
with his first period choice, in the second period he will enjoy the same good with a
offered surplus that depends on the evolution of the relative quality. As mention before,
this evolution is exogenous and is associated with the level of competition observed in the
industry. That is, with probability (1− δ) the relative qualities do not change, while with
probability δ relative qualities are reduced.
In terms of the network benefits enjoyed in his second period, it is clear that they
depend on the choice made by the new generation. Therefore, according to our expectation
rule (i.e. better quality firm captures the market or established firm does if qualities are
equal), it can be presented as follows. The network benefits are weighted by the parameter
ω that multiplies: i) the first term represents the network benefits derived by the fact that
the consumer is locked-in in the second period; and ii) it will enjoy and extra generation
if the technology adopted captures the market in the next period. This occurs with
probability p(i′ > j′|i, j) + p(i′ = j′|i, j), where i is the quality exhibit by firm f = 1 and
15This is the case, for example, of free software available on the internet. A consumer deciding to buy
a software, may consider free software as a benchmark of quality without caring too much about the
network benefits it provides.
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j is the quality of its competitor in the current period. i′ and j′ represent the quality
values in the next period for f = 1 and the competitor f = 0, respectively.
Analogously, we can describe the utility derived if the given generation of ”young”
consumers decides to purchase from the competing firm f = 0. The interpretation follows
the same lines as in the previous case.
u0j = aj + ω + β
[
(1− δ)aj + δaj−1
+ ω(1 + 1 · p(i′ < j′|i, j) + 1 · p(i′ = j′|i, j))
]
.
(2)
It can be shown that i ≥ j implies that the expression in equation (1) is greater than
the one in equation (2). This result is important in order to work with an expectation
rule that is dynamically consistent.
Given the homogeneity of the consumers, the demand function for each generation of
”young” consumers is described as follows. Suppose f represents the firm that exhibits
the installed base and i its quality, then, demand (the identity of the firm the ”young”
consumers buy from) as a function of the current state (i, j, f) is given by,
D(i, j, f) =
f if i ≥ jf− if i < j
Under our assumption of Bertrand price competition, equilibrium prices are described
as follows. Again, suppose f represents the firm that exhibits the installed base and i its
quality,
p*(i, j, f) =

ai + ω + β
[
ai − aj + ω(p(i′ > j′)− p(i′ < j′))
]
if i ≥ j
aj − ω + β
[
aj − ai + ω(p(j′ > i′)− p(j′ < i′))
]
if i < j
Where ai = (1−βδ)(ai−aj)+βδ(ai−1−aj−1) and aj = (1−βδ)(aj−ai)+βδ(aj−1−ai−1).
Given that each period the mass of new consumers is equal to 1, the per-period profits
pi(i, j, f) that result from product market competition equal the optimal Bertrand prices
just presented (i.e. p*(i, j, f) = pi(i, j, f)). Note that the determination of p*(i, j, f)
implicitly says that firms cannot price below zero. Given that marginal costs are equal
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to zero, this would be equivalent to negative mark-ups. However, the case of possible
negative mark-ups is not considered. Even though it could be an interesting extension,
negative mark-ups are associated with predatory pricing which is illegal and complicates
greatly the model.
As can be seen from the price equilibrium expression, the profits obtained in period t
depend on the expected qualities that are going to be realized in period t + 1, which in
turn depends on the investment decisions by the two firms. Thus, in order to solve for the
product market competition in t, we need to solve the dynamic problem that determines
the distribution of t + 1 qualities (i.e. equilibrium investments). In this way, we see
how equilibrium prices are derived from dynamic incentives due to the role of investment
decisions in affecting consumers choice. In order to do this, we need to state the dynamic
problem using the following Bellman equations.
2.4 Dynamic Setup
Let V (i, j, f) denote the expected net present value to firm f when its quality level is
given by i and the quality level by its competitor is given by j. In what follows, we first
characterize the value function V (i, j, f) under the presumption that the firm behaves
optimally. In a second step, we derive the policy function x(i, j, f). Throughout we take
the competitor firm’s investment strategy as given.
The Bellman equation is,
V (i, j, f) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, f)− cx+ β
[∑
i
∑
j
∑
f
V (i′, j′, f ′)p(f ′)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and c represents the marginal cost of investment.
The Bellman equation adds the firm’s current cash flow pi(i, j, f)− cx and its discounted
expected future cash flow.
Importantly, note that given our demand specification, a firm that captures the market
today becomes, unambiguously, the established incumbent tomorrow. Therefore, for f =
1, i ≥ j implies f ′ = 1 and f ′ = 0, otherwise. Analogously, for f = 0, i > j implies f ′ = 1
and f ′ = 0, otherwise. This allows us to simplify the Bellman equations as follows,
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V (i, j, 1) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, 1)− cx+ β
[∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 1)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
whenever i ≥ j (i.e. a firm with an installed base is able to maintain its dominant
position).
V (i, j, 1) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, 1)− cx+ β
[∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 0)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i < j (i.e. the established firm loses its dominance).
V (i, j, 0) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, 0)− cx+ β
[∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 1)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i > j (i.e. the firm without the installed base captures the market). And finally,
V (i, j, 0) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, 0)− cx+ β
[∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 0)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i ≤ j (i.e. the challenging firm keeps competing without an installed base).
Note that, for a given i′ and f ′, we can defineW1(i′) =
∑
j V (i
′, j′, 1)p(j′) andW0(i′) =∑
j V (i
′, j′, 0)p(j′) as the expected state of the competitor. Thus, the general expression
for the Bellman equation can be written as,
V (i, j, f) = sup
x≥0
[
pi(i, j, f)− cx+ β
[∑
i
Wf ′(i
′)p(i′)
]]
, (3)
where,
f ′ =

1 if f = 1 and i ≥ j
0 if f = 1 and i < j
1 if f = 0 and i > j
0 if f = 0 and i ≤ j
Note thatWf ′(i
′) is the expectation over all possible future states calculated under the
presumption that firm f invests x(i, j, f), and its competitor, firm f−, invests x(j, i, f−).
In addition, Wf ′(i
′) is all that firm f needs to know in order to compete in the market.
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2.5 Investment Strategies
The first-order condition (FOC) for an interior solution is,
∂pi(i, j, f)
∂xf
− c+ β
∑
i
Wf ′(i
′)
∂p(i′)
∂xf
= 0. (4)
for,
f ′ =

1 if f = 1 and i ≥ j
0 if f = 1 and i < j
1 if f = 0 and i > j
0 if f = 0 and i ≤ j
Consider i = 2 as a general case. It can be shown that the second-order condition is
satisfied whenever a solution to equation (4) exist. Moreover, the equilibrium investment
level is the maximum between zero and the value of x that solves equation (4).
2.6 Equilibrium
As we explained before, given that each firm, and therefore the industry, can be totally
described according to the state (i, j, f), this allows us to focus attention to symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) as defined by Maskin and Tirole (1988). This concept
selects those subgame-perfect equilibria where actions are a function only of pay-off rele-
vant state variables, and thus eliminates many of the vast multiplicity of subgame-perfect
equilibria that would normally exist in this type of model. Firms maximize their expected
discounted value of profits conditional on their expectations of the evolution of competi-
tion. Equilibrium occurs when the two firms’ expectations are consistent with the process
generated by the optimal policies of their competitors.16
Proof that equilibrium exists has been shown in the literature.17 The proof is omit-
ted both because it would replicate previous work and because such a proof would be
redundant given that our approach in this paper is to solve numerically for equilibrium
once the parameters of the model are defined. In the event that the numerical algorithm
16For a detailed review of this methodology, see Doraszelski and Pakes (2006).
17Given that the model does not consider explicitly the entry and/or exit decisions, existence is guar-
anteed. See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2005).
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converges, that is sufficient for existence of equilibrium for a specific set of parameters.18
A much greater problem of this kind of models is the potential multiplicity in the
number of equilibria. This is the reason for choosing to focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
That is, two firms that are at identical states are restricted to follow the same strategies. In
our setup, this amounts to say that if firm f is in state (i, j, f), he expects his competitor
f− to behave in the same way as firm f would behave being in state (j, i, f−). This
assumption is standard in the literature of Markov perfect games and serves also to
simplify greatly the computational burden of the model. We also check the multiplicity
of equilibria by allowing the numerical algorithm to start from different initial conditions.
No case was identified where there was more than one equilibrium.19
2.7 Computation
To compute the symmetric MPE, we use a variant of the algorithm described in Pakes and
McGuire (1994). The algorithm works iteratively. It takes a value function V˜ (i, j, f) and
a policy function x˜(i, j, f) as its input and generates updated value and policy functions
as its output. Each iteration proceeds as follows: First, we use equation (4) to compute
a firm f ’s investment strategy x(i, j, f) taking the other firm’s investment strategy to
be given by x˜(j, i, f−). In doing so, we use V˜ (i, j, f) and x˜(j, i, f−) to compute Wf ′(i′).
Second, we compute the payoff V (i, j, f) associated with firm f using x(i, j, f) andWf ′(i
′).
The iteration is completed by assigning V (i, j, f) to V˜ (i, j, f) and x(i, j, f) to x˜(i, j, f).
The algorithm terminates once the relative change in the value and the policy functions
from one iteration to the next are below a prespecified level of tolerance. All programs
are written in Matlab 6.5 and are available upon request.
2.8 Parametrization
We consider a time period as a year and calculate the discount factor, β, from an interest
rate of approximately 8%. This implies a discount factor of β = 0.925. Even though the
parameter of the marginal cost of investment, c, affects in an important way the long-run
behavior of the industry, the qualitative results tend to be maintained. For simplicity, we
18Convergence of the numerical algorithm is a sufficient condition for the existence of a ε-equilibrium.
See Benkard (2004).
19Similar approaches to analyze industry evolution are presented in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004),
Benkard (2004), Doraszelski and Markovich (2006) and Besanko et.al. (2006).
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assume initially c = 0.5.
The parameter that measures the level of competition is perhaps the most influential
and relevant parameter in our results. Given that no empirical estimation of this param-
eter is available for the case of a network industry, the results presented in this paper
consider different specifications. We believe that, as has been widely highlighted, network
goods are based on very fast-paced innovations, that very low values of δ are not very
realistic.
We assume that the (numerical) values of the qualities are given by q = 0, 1, ...,M − 1
for each state i = 1, 2, ...,M , respectively. That is, to quality state 1 corresponds a
numerical value of 0, to quality state 2 corresponds a numerical value of 1, and so on.
We use M = 15 as a benchmark. Given the role of the outside option, it is natural to
normalize to 0 the lower possible relative quality. It is assumed that 0 < ω < 1. This
assumption is important to maintain the consistency of the expectations rules explained
above.
We recognize that the potential relevance of the conclusions provided in this paper are
still to be corroborated by empirical analysis of network industries.
3 Results
In this section we present the results from our model of dynamic duopoly competition
with network externalities and endogenous and stochastic R&D processes. We start by
reporting the analysis of the level and determinants of R&D incentives, their implications
for industry evolution and the social efficiency of the market outcome. We relate our
results to the existing literature on competition in network industries taking into account
a dynamic perspective. Subsequently, we compare our results with the literature on inno-
vation and competition and examine the role of network externalities in this relationship.
Finally, we derive some policy recommendations and some empirical implications as a
motivation for further research.
3.1 R&D Incentives, Industry Evolution and Social Efficiency
We report the findings of this section in three steps. First, we describe the equilibrium
incentives to invest in R&D (i.e. equilibrium policy functions), the impact of network
externalities and the influence of relevant parameters (i.e. cost of innovation, level of
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competition) on those incentives. Second, we exploit the markov process that characterizes
the equilibrium of the industry and investigate whether the impact of network externalities
on the equilibrium R&D levels influences the dynamic evolution of the industry. In
particular, we discuss the short-run (transitory) dynamics, as well as the long-run (steady-
state) dynamics of the underlying markov process. And third, we briefly discuss the social
efficiency of the market outcome.
R&D Incentives. The equilibrium R&D investments (i.e. equilibrium policy func-
tions) constitute the core of the model as they represent the main strategic variable that
drives industry dynamics. For a firm, higher investments in R&D increase the probabil-
ity of observing a better quality in the next period, and hence, improve the conditions
under which product market competition takes place. However, investment are costly to
perform, so firms must consider the gains of additional investments in terms of expected
cash flows (i.e. higher qualities allow for higher prices) and strategic considerations (i.e.
higher qualities reduce the threat from a competitor) in comparison with the associated
cost.
In our model, this R&D competition takes the form of a preemption race. This is a
direct consequence of our dynamic modeling strategy of homogeneous consumers under
Bertrand quality competition. Specifically, the model shows that the two firms invest
heavily in R&D as long as their quality levels are equal or very close to each other. In
these situations (i.e. neck-and-neck configurations) the potential gains of developing a
slightly better quality may have profound and favorable economic consequences for the
innovative firm. Therefore, R&D incentives are very high, as they can decide the outcome
of the preemption race. In addition, and consistent with preemption race models, we show
that once asymmetric quality levels are realized, R&D investment decrease at a fast pace.
That is, the preemption race is practically decided in favor of the more innovative firm,
and therefore, the incentives to invest for the two firms are reduced after technological
leadership is decided. R&D investments are reduced because for the innovative (leading)
firm there is no imminent threat and for the competitor (follower) the potential gains
from innovating are drastically reduced.
To illustrate this situation, Figure 1 presents the equilibrium behavior of the main
components of the model (i.e. R&D investments (equilibrium policy functions), per period
profits (product market competition) and discounted future cash-flows (equilibrium value
functions)). The top panel shows the equilibrium values for the incumbent firm, while
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the lower panel shows the equilibrium values for the entrant firm. Variables are plotted
for a given firm as a function of the state space (i.e. qualities) of the industry. As can
be seen from the first column, R&D investment shows the preemption race behavior just
described: Fierce competition under neck-and-neck quality configurations. The next two
columns show the payoffs of the game (i.e. profits and equilibrium value functions) and
highlight the benefits of winning the preemption race. That is, payoffs are greater, the
higher the technological advantage that a firm can achieve.
Impact of network externalities. How does the presence of network externalities
affect the nature of competition just described for this industry?. The model shows that
the preemption race behavior of the industry is maintained. However, network externali-
ties unambiguously increase the incentives to invest in R&D, increasing the toughness of
the technological race. That is, the existence of an installed base increases the benefits
from innovating, as well as the cost from not innovating. Figure 2 shows the difference
in R&D investments levels from having different values of the parameter that measures
the extent of the network benefits (i.e. ω = 0.4, ω = 0.6 and ω = 0.8). In this Figure,
we consider the level of competition as δ = 0.6, but the results are robust to different
parameters’ configurations. Not surprisingly, given the preemption race behavior, the
impact of network externalities on the R&D incentives is stronger for the case when the
quality levels are very similar between competitors. That is, in the presence of network
externalities, the achievement of a higher quality level (relative to that of the competitor)
not only permits to capture the market, but implies an ”installed base” advantage that
protects the incumbent firm in the case of quality ties. Therefore, network externalities
provide a strong incentive to achieve a quality innovation in order to enjoy the benefits of
the installed base of consumers. At the same time, when network benefits are important,
losing a quality advantage makes more difficult to compete in the market.
These results are consistent with the literature on competition in network industries.
For instance, as stated by Evans and Schmalensee (2001), network industries ”compete for
the market” and, in consequence, investments in R&D represent the main strategic tool
for competition. Hence, network externalities promote R&D efforts because they provide
the (only) mean to secure market survival. In addition, Katz and Shapiro (1994) state that
the frequent introduction of new technologies is a common pattern in network industries.
Moreover, they argue that this frequent innovation process goes actually beyond the
level of innovation that is socially optimal. They term this situation as ”insufficient
19
friction”, as the introduction of innovations is smoother than the level that would be
socially optimal. In a different strand of literature, Aghion et. al. (2005) show that in
innovative industries, R&D investments allow firms to escape from competition. That is,
even though the benefits of innovation might be reduced by a strong market competition
(i.e. rent dissipation), these benefits more than compensate the losses from not innovating.
They termed this phenomenon as the ”escape effect” and we can interpret the role of
network externalities as enhancing the divergence between the benefits of innovating and
the potential loses of not doing so.
In addition, the incentives to invest in R&D are also related to some relevant pa-
rameters. Figure 3 presents the equilibrium investment levels exhibited by firm f as a
function of its own quality level, the quality of its competitor, the level of competition
(i.e. δ) and the marginal cost of investment (i.e. c).20. This figure highlights two main
features of the model that will be important, in particular the second, in understanding
the impact of network externalities. First, the investment levels are, for any parameter
values, decreasing in their marginal costs. The intuition is straightforward.
Second, the investment levels behave non-monotonically to variations in the level of
competition δ. In particular, the investment levels tend to follow an inverted U-shaped
trajectory. Recall that δ represents the potential exogenous probability of a decrease in
the firm’s own relative quality level. A consequence of the competitive environment. This
implies that the level of investments inside an industry are related, non-monotonically,
to the level of competition.21 We present the implications of this observation in the next
subsection.
Industry Evolution. Given that the investment levels determine the probability
of reaching a higher quality level, they impact decisively the long-run performance of
the industry. Moreover, given the equilibrium concept adopted, the industry evolves
in a markov fashion. In order to exploit this feature of the model, and to relay less
on simulations, we construct the distribution over future quality states (i.e. transition
matrix) and analyze the impact of network externalities on this distribution. In particular,
we compute the transient (short-run) distribution of the stochastic process associated
with the evolution of the industry.22 In addition, we compute the limiting (long-run)
20For simplicity, Figure 3 presents the results for the case of only 3 quality levels but the result extends
to a state space of higher dimension
21This result is reminiscent of the inverted U-shape relation between the level of competition in an
industry and the incentives to innovate found in Aghion et. al (2005) and Aghion and Griffith (2005).
22Given an initial state, the transient distribution determines the probability of being in any other state
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distribution that describes the steady state behavior of the industry. It shows the invariant
probability that, for any initial state, in the long run a firm will find itself in any particular
state.23 With these tools, we are able to analyze the evolution of the industry over different
time horizons and to evaluate the impact on profits, investments and welfare of different
parameter configurations from a time perspective.
In our model, the transition to the steady-state is relatively slow. On average, this
transition (the number of periods after which the transient distribution is equal to the
limiting distribution) occurs in approximately 25-30 periods. Moreover, the model shows,
as expected, that in the short-run industry exhibits a neck-and-neck structure. That is,
before the steady-state is reached, firms compete fiercely for dominance if their quality
difference is not too big. This result can be seen from Figures 4, 5, and 6. These Figures
plot the transient distribution over different time horizons taking as initial condition a
duopoly with equal quality levels. In particular, Figure 4 shows the transient distribution,
in the left panel, after 5 periods. For this Figure, the initial configuration of the industry
is a duopoly with equal quality levels (ai = 4), in which one of the firms exhibits an
installed base of consumer.
The middle panel shows the change in the transient distribution for increasing the
parameter that measures the extent of network externalities from ω = 0.4 to ω = 0.8.
This allows us to see the impact of network externalities. As can be seen, the probability
of observing neck-and-neck situations after 5 periods is increased as a consequence of the
presence of network externalities. This results holds for every parameter configurations.
In particular, Figures 5 and 6 show the same result but considering the case of a longer
horizon, that is, they present the transient distribution after 15 and 25 periods.
It can also be shown, that in this transition process, R&D incentives are higher that
the level reached in the long-run. As Figure 6 suggests, in the long-run the industry is
highly concentrated. This is an outcome of the preemption race. This result is robust to
any parametrization and it follows from the nature of competition.
Social efficiency. One of the main objectives of this paper is to analyze the social
efficiency of the private incentives to innovate. In order to do this, we solve the social
after a prespecified number of periods. This distribution is defined as follows. For M possible states, let
P be the M2 ×M2 transition matrix of the markov process of industry evolution that can be computed
using the equilibrium investment levels. Then, the marginal (transient) distribution after T periods is
given by a(T ) = a(0)PT , where a(0) is the 1×M2 initial distribution.
23The 1 ×M2 limiting distribution pi, is the distribution that solves the system of linear equations
pi = Ppi, where P is the M2 ×M2 equilibrium transition matrix.
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planner problem. This is done by considering the case of a monopolist in charge of the two
technologies (i.e. network goods) and that prices equal marginal cost (i.e. zero and there-
fore maximizing consumer surplus which is equal to social surplus in our homogeneous
consumer framework presented in equations (1) and (2)).
The main result obtained by analyzing the problem of the social planner is that there
is too much R&D in the industry. The main implication of this result is that there is
too much introduction of improved goods in the market. Given that the social planner
internalizes the costs associated with the quality improvements, it tends to concentrate
investment in the firm that exhibits a quality advantage. This result implies that a
technology that exhibits a better quality tend to stay as the preferred technology because
it maximizes the network benefits enjoyed by the population. As a consequence, this result
also shows that the market outcome induces too much introduction of new incompatible
technologies.
Table 1 presents some results for the social planner’s problem. In particular, it presents
two important results. First, a high level of competition (ie. a high δ) reduces the
expected social surplus and also reduce the expected investment levels. And second, it
states that with a high level of competition, the extent of network externalities is critical
in determining the size of the inefficiency associated with the investment levels.
3.2 Competition, Innovation and Policy Implications
One advantage of the model presented in this paper, is that it allows us to analyze the
relationship between the outcome of the product market and the level of competition. In
particular, we try to evaluate some assertions present in the literature about innovative
industries.
We perform this analysis in three steps. First, we discuss the impact on competition
on per period profits and on the equilibrium level of R&D investments. This allows us to
compare our results with novel results on the literature on innovation and competition.
In particular, we related our findings to those of Aghion et. al. (2005) and Aghion and
Griffith (2005). Second, we investigate how the presence of network externalities affects
this relationship between innovation and competition. We provide an intuition for the
results. And third, we perform numerical simulations to evaluate the interaction between
variables that can be affected by public policy (i.e. cost of R&D, level of competition)
and the extent of network externalities. We provide some results concerning the ability
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of public policy to increase consumers’ welfare in network industries.
Competition and innovation. In order to evaluate the impact of the level of com-
petition on the level (or pace) of innovation observed in a network industry, we need a
(theoretical) variable that mirrors the level of competition and a (theoretical) variable
related with the amount of innovation exhibited by the industry. We use the level of com-
petition (i.e δ) as a measure of the level of competition faced by the industry. According
to Boone (2000, 2001), if a parameter increase in the chosen variable (i.e δ) increases
the relative profits of more advanced firms (i.e the profitability of firms with a higher
quality level) such variable represents a suitable measure of the level of competition. This
condition is corroborated by the model.
We approximate the level of innovation by calculating the conditional expected value
of the R&D investments observed in equilibrium. Due to our modeling strategy, the
probability of innovation is stochastically increasing (in the first-order stochastic domi-
nance sense) in the level of R&D investments. As an alternative measure, we also use the
intensity of R&D (i.e. R&D investments divided by sales).
The main result we obtain states that the impact of the level on competition on the
R&D equilibrium levels depends on the time horizon considered. In particular, by using
the tools from the stochastic process literature employed in the previous subsection, we
show that in the short-run, the level of innovation and the level of competition exhibit
and inverted-U relationship. In contrast, the model shows that in the long-run, a higher
level of competition is always associated with higher levels of innovation. These results
are presented in Table 2.
In order to understand the implications of these findings, we briefly review the existing
literature on the topic. Specifically, the Schumpeterian approach to market innovation
states that in the event of an increase in competition, firms tend to reduce their innovation
levels because higher competition dissipates some of the rents associated with higher
market power. This has been termed the ”Schumpeterian effect”. However, it has been
empirically shown that in some cases this relation is positive.24
This case of direct relation between the level of competition and the incentives to
innovate can be explained as follows. Although it could be the case that the expected
rents from innovating are reduced by the presence of higher competition (i.e. as the
Schumpeterian view sustain), a higher level of competition may imply higher innovation
24See Geroski (1995), Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999).
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if the rents from not innovating are much lower (i.e. even though under higher competition
innovation is less profitable, it is better than not innovating). This has been termed the
”escape effect”. This distinction between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents has
been explained in the literature by the preemption race literature25. However, this latter
literature does not consider the impact of the level of competition on this interaction
between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents (i.e. the determinants of the ”escape
effect”). This paper allows us to analyze this impact.
In general terms, the two effects (i.e. the Schumpeterian and escape effects) have been
made compatible by Aghion et al. (1997), Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion and Griffith
(2005). In particular, the level of innovation behaves as an inverted U-shape function in
relation to the level of competition.26 That is, for low levels of competition, the investment
level tends to increase as competition become fiercer (i.e. escape effect) and, eventually,
starts declining in the presence of high competition (i.e. Schumpeterian effect). This is
the result we obtain in the short-run.
However, we show that in the long-run, the escape effect dominates the Schumpeterian
effect. The main implication of this result is that in order to foster innovation in the long-
run, competition should be promoted instead of limited. Below, we show some simulations
that present some specific results related to this implication.
Policy implications. We performed a number of simulations in order to track the
evolution of the industry and to evaluate the impact of changes in policy relevant param-
eters. In particular, we consider the level of competition (i.e. δ) and the role of the cost of
R&D (i.e. c) and derive some results in terms of consumer welfare. These results are sum-
marized in Figures 7 and 8 where we plot the evolution of the qualities of the two firms,
the associated R&D incentives and per-period profits. Tables 3, 4 and 5 present more
detailed results. In Figure 7, we consider the case of low level of competition and a high
cost of R&D. In Figure 8, we increase the level of competition, while reducing the cost of
performing R&D investments. An increase in the level of competition can be associated
with any action or measure that improves the strategic position of a firm’s competitors.
For example, policy measures as mandatory licensing or diffusion of information on the
operability of new technologies could be interpreted as an increase in parameter δ.27
25See Reinganum (1989)
26This theoretical finding is in line with the empirical results of Scherer (1967), Levin et al. (1985) and
is specifically tested in Aghion et al. (2005).
27Evans and Schmalensee (2005) discuss the measures taken after the conclusion of the Microsoft trial.
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We summarize three main findings. First, by reducing the cost of performing R&D (i.e.
parameter c), short-run competition is intensified, reducing the probability of observing
a single forever-dominant incumbent firm. Second, an increase in the level of competition
without a reduction in the cost of R&D may actually increase the probability of observing
an early industry leader. Therefore, in an innovative industry, policies that increase
the level of competition are beneficial for innovation, but should be implemented with
measures that increase the incentives to innovate in order to provide a higher surplus to
consumers. And third, an increase in the level of competition and a reduction in the costs
of R&D might reduce the temporary dominance of leading firms, increase competition
and increase consumers’ surplus. That is, the preemption race lasts, on average, a longer
period of time. As can be seen in the first panel of Figure 7, the state (quality) space
shows that the race lasts around 65 periods, after which a clear winner is observed. In
contrast, Figure 8 shows (first panel) how an increase in the level of competition and a
reduction in the costs associated to R&D activities are translated into a longer race (i.e.
to 95 periods).
The main implication of these results is that the larger the time length of the race, the
higher the surplus enjoyed by consumers. As can be seen from Figure 8 (second panel),
the two firms invest more in R&D as a result of an increase in the level of competition.
This is consistent with the ”escape effect” emphasized by Aghion et. al (2005), That is,
as competition becomes stronger, the strategic value of R&D is increased, and therefore
firms invest more aggressively to develop a new innovation. As a consequence, a higher
technological advance is observed (higher qualities of the network goods). At the same
time, a longer race implies that the profits earned by the firms are reduced as shown also in
Figure 8 (third panel). Therefore, a greater part of the surplus generated in this industry
is transferred to consumers, by means of lower prices and better available technologies.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a dynamic model of quality competition in the presence of
network externalities that adapts the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework presented
in Ericson and Pakes (1995). We solved the model numerically using a variant of the
Among the measures adopted, they report that for example ”Microsoft must license to third parties under
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms any intellectual property rights needed to exercise any of the
options or alternatives provided to them under [the remedy provisions]”.
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algorithm presented in Pakes and McGuire (1994). Incentives to invest in R&D are
derived endogenously. The focus of this paper was twofold. First, to develop a model
flexible enough to analyze the impact of network externalities on R&D incentives along
several dimensions. For example, to make the distinction between short and long-run,
to be able to compare the results with novel results from the innovation literature and
to explicitly account for the role of the level of market competition on market outcomes.
Second, by being able to relate the results to a wide range of literature, the model attempts
to provide policy recommendations for network industries where innovations are the main
driver of dynamic performance.
We departed from the current literature on network industries by focusing our analysis
on four main areas. First, we considered endogenous and uncertain R&D efforts taking
into account the way consumers form expectations. Second, we embedded our analysis in
a fully dynamic framework. Third, we explicitly considered the impact on the short and
long-run social efficiency of the R&D incentives that drives the evolution of the network
industry and the role of competition policy in this evolution. And fourth, we provided an
assessment of the question whether competition policy should be cautious in dynamically
competing industries.
We showed three main results. First, network externalities affect positively the in-
centives to invest in R&D. Competition resembles a preemption race and installed bases
increase the prize that can be won by a successful competitor. As a consequence, it is not
surprising that market performance tends to over-invest in R&D. Second, network exter-
nalities have an important impact on the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although
in the long-run a single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race), in the short-run
competition is stronger and concentrated on neck-and-neck technological configurations.
And third, policy measures that increase the level of competition and extend the short-
run behavior of the industry have an important impact on consumer welfare and R&D
incentives.
We recognize several areas of further research on R&D incentives in the presence of
network externalities. A deeper analysis of the different ways about how consumers form
expectations (or coordinate) may provide new insights on the interplay between R&D
incentives in network industries. In addition, the analysis of compatibility decisions must
also be considered given its obvious relevance in these industries but for the time being
beyond the scope of the present paper.
26
References
Aghion, P., C. Harris, and J. Vickers, (1997), ”Competition and Growth with Step-by-
Step Innovation: An Example”, European Economic Review, Papers and Proceed-
ings, 771-782.
Aghion, P., C. Harris, P. Howitt, and J. Vickers, (2001), ”Competition, Imitation and
Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation”, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 467-492.
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith and P. Howitt, (2005), ”Competition and
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120,
701-728.
Aghion, P. and R. Griffith, (2005), ”Competition and Growth. Reconciling Theory and
Evidence”. Zeuthen Lectures. MIT Press.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt, (1992), ”A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”,
Econometrica, 60, 323-51.
Arthur, W.B., (2000), ”Myths and Realities of the High-Tech Economy”, Talk given at
Credit Suisse First Boston Though Leader Forum,Santa Fe Institute.
Bagnoli, M., S. Salant, and J., Swierzbinski (1989), ”Durable-goods Monopoly with
Discrete Demand”, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1459-1478.
Benkard, C. L., (2004), ”A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial
Aircraft”, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 581-611.
Bensaid, B. and Lesne, J.P., (1996), ”Dynamic Monopoly Pricing with Network Exter-
nalities”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 837-855.
Besanko, D. and U. Doraszelski, (2004), ”Capacity Dynamics and Endogenous Asym-
metries in Firm Size”, RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 23-49.
Besanko, D., U. Doraszelski, Y. Kryukov, and M. Satterthwaite, (2006), ”Learning-by-
Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics”, Working Paper, Har-
vard University.
27
Besen, S. and J. Farrell, (1994), ”Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 117-131.
Boone, J., (2000), ”Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and
Process Innovation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 549-69.
Boone, J., (2001), ”Intensity of Competition and the Incentive to Innovate”, Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 705-26.
De Bijil, P.W.J. and S. Goyal, (1995), ”Technological Change in Markets with Network
Externalities”, International of Industrial Organization, 13, 307-325.
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, and J. Van Reenen, (1999), ”Market Share, Market Value and
Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms”, Review of Economic Studies,
66, 529-554.
Caballero, R. and A. Jaffe (1993), ”How High are the Giants Shoulders? An Empir-
ical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of
Economic Growth”, NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 15-74.
Choi, J.P., (1994), ”Irreversible Choice of Uncertain Technologies with Network Exter-
nalities”, RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 382-401.
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz, (1980), ”Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative
Activity”, Economic Journal, 90, 266-293.
Doraszelski, U. and S. Markovich, (2006), ”Advertising Dynamics and Competitive Ad-
vantage”, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Doraszelski, U. and A. Pakes, (2006), ”A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis
in I.O.”, forthcoming in Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter (eds.) Handbook of
Industrial Organization, Volume 3, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Doraszelski, U. and M. Satterthwaite, (2005), ”Foundations of Markov-Perfect Indus-
try Dynamics: Existence, Purification and Multiplicity”, Working Paper, Harvard
University.
Ericson R. and A. Pakes, (1995), ”Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work”, Review of Economic Studies, 62, 53-82.
28
Evans, D. E. and R. Schmalensee, (2001), ”Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis
in Dynamically Competitive Industries”, NBER Working Paper No. 8268.
Evans, D. E., Nichols, A. L. and R. Schmalensee, (2005), ”U.S. v. Microsoft: Did
Consumers Win?”, NBER Working Paper No. 11727.
Farrell, J. and M. Katz, (2005), ”Competition or Predation? Consumer Coordination,
Strategic Pricing and Price Floors in Network Markets”, Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, LIII, 203-231.
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, (1985), ”Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation”,
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 16, 70-83.
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, (1986), ”Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Prod-
uct Preannouncement, and Predation”, American Economic Review, 76, 940-955.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, (2000), ”Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry”, Journal
of Industrial Economics, XLVIII, 373-390.
Gabel, L., (1991), ”Competitive Strategies for Product Standards”, London: McGraw
Hill.
Geroski, P., (1995), ”Market Structure, Corporate Performance and Innovative Activ-
ity”, Oxford University Press.
Grindley, P., (1995), ”Standards Strategy and Policy. Cases and Stories”, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1985), ”Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibil-
ity”, American Economic Review, vol. 75, 424-440.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1986), ”Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 822-84.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1992), ”Product Introduction with Network Externalities”,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 55-84.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1994), ”Systems Competition and Network Effects”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 93-115.
29
Kristiansen, E.G., (1996), ”R&D in Markets with Network Externalities, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 769-784.
Levin, R., W. Cohen, and D. Mowery, (1985), ”R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and
Market Structure: New Evidence on some Schumpeterian Hypotheses”, American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75, 20-24.
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole, (1988), ”A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly: I & II”, Economet-
rica, 56, 549-600.
Nickell, S., (1996), ”Competition and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Political
Economy, 104, 724-746.
Pakes, A. and P. McGuire, (1994), ”Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Nu-
merical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated-Product Model”, RAND Journal
of Economics, 25, 555-589.
Reinganum, J., (1989), ”The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Dif-
fusion”. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, (eds.) (1989). Handbook of Industrial
Organization, North-Holland. 849-908.
Shapiro, C. and H. Varian, (1999). Information Rules: A strategic guide to the network
economy. Harvard Business School Press.
30
Figure 1: Main Variables. Incumbent firm (top panel). Entrant firm (bottom panel).
31
Figure 2: Impact of Network Externalities on R&D levels. Incumbent firm (top panel).
Entrant firm (bottom panel).
32
Figure 3: R&D Levels (as a function of the investments’ costs c and the level of competition
δ). This graph is calculated for the case of 3 quality levels (ai = 0, 1, 2)
33
Figure 4: Transient Distribution (short-run) for T = 5. Incumbent firm (top panel).
Entrant firm (bottom panel).
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Figure 5: Transient Distribution (short-run) for T = 15. Incumbent firm (top panel).
Entrant firm (bottom panel).
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Figure 6: Transient Distribution (medium-run) for T = 25. Incumbent firm (top panel).
Entrant firm (bottom panel).
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Figure 7: Industry Simulations - δ = 0.4, c = 0.8, ω = 0.5
37
Figure 8: Industry Simulations - δ = 0.8, c = 0.4, ω = 0.5
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Table 1: Industry Performance - Social Planner
ω = 0.4 ω = 0.8 ω = 0.8
δ = 0.4
E(pi(i, j, f)) 4.44 3.01 5.20
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.76 0.55 0.63
Inefficiency on x 0.31 0.25 0.38
δ = 0.7
E(pi(i, j, f)) 1.66 1.75 3.76
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.53 0.38 0.46
Inefficiency on x 0.08 0.13 0.43
Notes: The table shows the mean of each variable
observed for each quality state. Values are weighted
using the limiting (long-run) distribution of the
associated markov process.
Table 2: R&D Intensity (R&D Expenditures / Sales)
Short-run T = 5 Long-run T =∞
ω = 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 ω = 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
δ = 0.2 1.190 1.078 0.987 0.912 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
δ = 0.4 1.227 1.133 1.056 0.990 0.033 0.034 0.080 0.035
δ = 0.6 1.122 1.045 0.980 0.924 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057
δ = 0.8 0.804 0.634 0.728 0.697 0.117 0.115 0.113 0.111
Notes: The table shows the mean of the R&D intensity observed in each quality state. Values
are weighted using the limiting (long-run) distribution of the associated markov process.
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Table 3: Simulations of Industry Evolution - Short-run (T = 5)
Variable: Incumbent Firm (at t = 0) Entrant Firm (at t = 0)
δ ↓, ω → 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
1. R&D Investments (x):
0.2 34.41 37.63 38.38 39.22 37.38 36.66 37.34 38.69
(10.26) (8.97) (9.88) (8.68) (9.25) (9.59) (9.77) (8.05)
0.4 34.04 33.77 35.34 34.55 32.73 34.49 33.54 36.37
(7.20) (8.03) (8.38) (8.03) (8.13) (8.06) (8.93) (7.30)
0.6 30.65 30.90 31.64 32.54 29.24 30.44 30.74 31.82
(7.29) (7.54) (7.53) (7.55) (7.64) (7.52) (7.98) (7.42)
0.8 24.04 24.95 24.93 26.63 22.04 22.62 24.62 25.52
(6.87) (8.14) (8.33) (7.91) (7.22) (7.81) (8.36) (8.32)
2. Cash Flows (pi − cx):
0.2 -7.06 -6.55 -5.66 -5.80 -6.73 -7.59 -6.85 -7.16
(3.04) (3.98) (4.15) (3.57) (4.25) (4.00) (4.71) (4.60)
0.4 -5.70 -5.26 -3.55 -4.53 -6.67 -5.67 -5.16 -4.97
(4.30) (3.78) (4.91) (4.23) (3.28) (3.70) (4.37) (5.65)
0.6 -4.36 -3.99 -2.81 -2.65 -5.19 -4.73 -4.25 -4.15
(4.14) (3.99) (5.32) (4.87) (3.58) (4.28) (4.86) (5.30)
0.8 -2.95 -1.63 -1.11 -0.58 -3.87 -2.72 -1.96 -1.97
(3.80) (3.71) (5.41) (5.50) (2.75) (3.79) (5.56) (5.49)
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Each calculation is based on
100 simulation runs. The parameter values are specified in the table, using c = 0.3 and β = 0.925.
At t = 0 both firms are symmetric in quality with ai = aj = 3.
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Table 4: Simulations of Industry Evolution - Medium-run (T = 25)
Variable: Incumbent Firm (at t = 0) Entrant Firm (at t = 0)
δ ↓, ω → 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
1. R&D Investments (x):
0.2 55.83 66.99 63.95 65.73 64.13 61.41 63.37 65.79
(24.40) (23.73) (24.61) (23.48) (24.34) (24.16) (24.83) (23.89)
0.4 71.35 65.47 70.99 65.48 63.82 71.69 66.39 73.99
(26.07) (28.28) (27.63) (28.68) (26.38) (26.92) (29.15) (26.29)
0.6 70.36 68.74 73.76 75.34 66.21 69.70 67.16 70.23
(27.56) (29.46) (28.35) (29.70) (29.49) (29.97) (32.16) (29.13)
0.8 58.59 60.94 56.42 64.10 52.55 52.92 60.93 58.67
(28.09) (30.48) (31.41) (29.18) (28.98) (29.67) (30.85) (30.47)
2. Cash Flows (pi − cx):
0.2 18.11 23.81 24.79 25.98 29.63 13.43 23.78 22.65
(45.06) (43.81) (48.91) (45.40) (50.03) (41.34) (46.95) (44.66)
0.4 22.87 15.80 27.50 18.54 12.82 26.05 21.90 33.15
(44.59) (38.74) (46.98) (44.40) (40.27) (44.55) (43.74) (50.28)
0.6 17.27 16.28 22.40 21.92 10.56 15.24 13.22 14.81
(39.23) (37.22) (39.87) (38.65) (32.80) (36.21) (36.04) (38.12)
0.8 8.60 10.58 13.10 15.85 7.93 7.80 14.47 10.49
(21.09) (20.08) (27.38) (26.79) (17.59) (22.89) (26.48) (25.00)
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Each calculation is based on
100 simulation runs. The parameter values are specified in the table, using c = 0.3 and β = 0.925.
At t = 0 both firms are symmetric in quality with ai = aj = 3.
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Table 5: Simulations of Industry Evolution - Long-run (T = 100)
Variable: Incumbent Firm (at t = 0) Entrant Firm (at t = 0)
δ ↓, ω → 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
1. R&D Investments (x):
0.2 56.77 68.51 65.33 67.34 65.29 62.41 64.68 67.06
(25.16) (24.59) (25.56) (24.52) (25.05) (24.90) (25.74) (24.81)
0.4 73.82 67.66 73.37 67.58 65.77 74.40 68.95 77.00
(27.69) (30.10) (29.44) (30.46) (28.07) (28.73) (31.14) (28.14)
0.6 75.38 73.39 78.90 80.69 71.16 74.95 71.97 74.68
(30.99) (33.23) (32.01) (33.52) (33.36) (33.93) (36.29) (33.07)
0.8 66.83 68.82 63.93 72.27 59.51 60.63 68.98 66.32
(34.37) (36.15) (37.60) (34.90) (35.08) (35.11) (36.80) (36.07)
2. Cash Flows (pi − cx):
0.2 33.42 44.17 41.99 44.73 51.20 27.26 42.19 40.32
(65.65) (63.69) (70.77) (67.41) (71.20) (61.01) (68.73) (66.53)
0.4 46.08 34.26 48.67 34.73 30.24 49.63 44.17 59.37
(64.60) (58.95) (69.07) (65.51) (60.04) (65.58) (64.41) (71.58)
0.6 36.52 34.70 42.95 44.39 27.73 34.39 31.30 32.85
(56.90) (54.36) (58.71) (57.24) (48.84) (53.06) (53.64) (56.73)
0.8 18.04 18.65 22.36 26.13 12.58 16.77 24.75 19.51
(29.75) (28.20) (37.30) (36.97) (26.34) (32.52) (36.49) (34.33)
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Each calculation is based on
100 simulation runs. The parameter values are specified in the table, using c = 0.3 and β = 0.925.
At t = 0 both firms are symmetric in quality with ai = aj = 3.
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